

From the Editor

Today's complex operational environment demands that we out-think, out-act and out-maneuver a variety of adversaries. To provide a resource for that kind of agility, professors, fellows and students in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) face a daunting challenge: rewrite, staff and publish the Army's keystone manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*. Assisted by the insight and experience of active and retired generals, these officers are adding sinew to a skeletal rendering of the Army's role across the operational spectrum. The manual's new offense, defense, stability and support (ODSS) framework shows that units have multiple roles but emphasize them differently depending on whether the mission is peacekeeping, unconventional operations or major theater war.

In this issue's Theory and Doctrine section, Echevarria and Biever confront a fundamental aspect of military operations, the moral domain, as they discuss four specific contemporary challenges—increased complexity, increased speed and tempo, heightened isolation and unprecedented lethality. Next, you might want to read Hooker's Insights piece on theory, doctrine and maneuver warfare before proceeding to Tooke's explanation of how maneuver and firepower should blend in our warfighting doctrine. Keithly offers suggestions on how to control our air components and make the joint fight more efficient. Taking a slightly different approach to Clausewitz's work than the Army traditionally does, Milan Vego explains the concept of center of gravity beyond what we typically parrot—"the hub of all power on which everything depends."

The US bombing of retreating Iraqis—who were not the center of gravity—during Operation *Desert Storm* has drawn numerous critiques—and an advocate in this issue of *MR*. In a philosophical treatise, Stacey Obenhaus uses just war theory to defend the coalition actions and promote ethical decision making in future conflicts.

Operations today are not all maneuver, firepower and close air support. As stability and support operations (SASO) proliferate, philosophical and practical discussions naturally shift to close encounters of a more peaceful kind. To prepare for SASO's functional aspects, Nagl and Young propose modifying training at the dirt training centers so that *all* scenarios train units for peace operations as well as combat. Because the financial constraints can threaten peace operations, Vowell explains the pitfalls of misusing operational funds for support of local nationals, regardless of how noble or worthy the cause. An expert in nonlethal weapon technologies, Heal walks through the different stages of civil unrest and the implications for military forces.

In the Leadership section Sweetnam questions senior leaders who rule from the top without leading from the front. He offers suggestions about leaders' roles and functions, and quietly wonders when principled officers will resign to demonstrate their convictions. Commanders help their units and subordinates learn by communicating not just their intent for an operation, but the rationale behind it, writes Shattuck. According to a 1945 War Department pamphlet, soldiers die in combat unless we learn and live. That holds true today in low-intensity or total war, and Johnson demonstrates the role of documented after action reviews in organizational growth and effectiveness.

From the ethereal realm of classical military theory to the practical conundrums of Army operations *du jour*, this issue of *MR* spans the Army's contemporary spectrum. Wherever you are in the continuum, let us know what you are doing—and thinking.

LJH